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This paper examines the role that tariffs, domestic taxes, and regulatory requirements 
pose on access to essential drugs, vaccines and devices for the diseases that afflict the developing 
world. While aid has increased in recent years and the price of many drugs has fallen, access to 
medicines, vaccines and devices has not increased greatly. There are numerous reasons for this, 
notably the paucity of medical professionals in the poorest countries. The major one discussed in 
this paper is the barrier imposed by recipient countries themselves. For example the combined 
domestic tax and import tariff barrier in India until recently was over 60% and in Morocco it 
currently stands at 38%. Only just over a third of Indians have access to essential drugs and it is 
likely that a reduction of these financial impediments would increase access. Removal of these 
barriers would therefore likely save thousands of lives across the developing world. Southern 
African countries generally have fewer tariff barriers. But if South Africa removed its 14% sales 
tax, HIV patients could afford more food, and many are currently malnourished. Furthermore, 
many Southern African countries, such as Namibia, impose regulatory constraints (expensive 
and time consuming registration of products already approved in US/EU), which reduce access 
to essential medicines. 1 
 
Still Taxed to Death:  
An Analysis of Taxes and Tariffs on Medicines, Vaccines and Medical Devices 
 
Roger Bate, Richard Tren and Jasson Urbach 
 
1. Introduction 
According to the World Health Organisation, (WHO), approximately one third 
of the world’s population lacks access to essential medicines and proper medical 
treatment.
1  Although this figure represents between 1.3 and 2.1 billion people, and is 
a serious cause for concern, access to medicines has actually increased in recent years.  
In 1975 less than half of the world’s population had access to medicines and although 
the overall number of people without access to medicines has remained constant, the 
proportion of the world’s population without access has fallen.  The primary reason 
for this increase in access to medicines is most likely to be a result of rising incomes 
and increased prosperity in many developing countries, particularly in South East 
Asia.
2 Indeed, the World Bank estimates that the Southern Asian economies grew at 
7.8% and 6.7% in 2003 and 2004 respectively.
3 Furthermore, the Bank estimates that 
low-income countries grew at rates of 7.2% and 6.3% in 2003 and 2004 respectively.
4 
Access to medicines is lowest in poor countries, which also have the lowest 
life expectancy and high disease burdens.
5  The reasons for inadequate access to 
medicines and to medical care are numerous and varied.  This paper looks at the 
extent to which import tariffs, taxes, duties and bureaucratic rules and regulations 
deny people medicines.  This paper is an updated version of an earlier research 
working paper, Taxed to Death, published in May 2005 with the AEI-Brookings Joint 
Centre on Regulatory Affairs. 
                                                 
1 World Health Organization (2004), “The World Medicines Situation,” WHO, Geneva, p 63. 
2 For instance, between 1960 and 2000 in Malaysia and Thailand, per capita GDP rose from US$ 974 
to US$ 4,796 and US$ 464 to US$ 2,804 respectively (Constant 1995 US$). Source: US-ASEAN 
Business Council, “ASEAN Finance and Marcroeconomic Surveillance Unit (FMSU) Database,” 
available at: http://www.us-asean.org/aftatariffs.asp (accessed December 18, 2005). 
3The World Bank Group (2005), South Asia Data Profile.  World Development Indicators database.  
August 2005.  Available at: 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=SAS&CCODE=SAS&CNAME
=South+Asia&PTYPE=CP, (accessed February 20, 2006).  
4The World Bank Group (2005), Low Income Data Profile.  World Development Indicators database.  
August 2005. Available at: 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=LIC&CCODE=LIC&CNAME=
Low+income&PTYPE=CP, (accessed January 20, 2006). 
5 In 2003 low-income countries had an average life expectancy of 58.3 years compared to high-income 2 
 
Our initial analysis showed that countries routinely increased the price of 
medicines to consumers through import tariffs, other duties and sales taxes by over 
20% and sometimes by as much as 40%. We have updated our data from the latest 
COTECNA database
6 and have gathered the most recent data available on value 
added taxes and other charges on medicines.  Since the publication of Taxed to Death, 
the World Health Organisation (WHO) published a study by Richard Laing and Muge 
Olcay (2005). The study examines the degree to which 151 countries impose import 
tariffs on completed pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical ingredients (API).We 
use their larger database to analyse the relationship between import tariffs and access 
to medicines and tariffs in vaccines and vaccination rates. 
The broad conclusions of the WHO paper concurred with our initial 
conclusions; that import tariffs and taxes should be removed as they are highly 
regressive. Laing and Olcay(2005) conclude, “It is vital that policy makers, both at a 
national and international level, address the issue of tariffs on medicines and 
recognize the regressive nature of these duties, which ultimately tax the sick without 
regard for their economic status or ability to afford these medicines.  Pharmaceutical 




Taxed to Death, examined data on import tariffs for organic chemicals that are 
used in the manufacture of pharmaceuticals as well as active pharmaceutical 
ingredients (API) and completed pharmaceuticals.  In order to do this we used the 
Essential Drugs List (EDL) published by the World Health Organisation. We 
identified the customs classification of these drugs using an international benchmark 
namely the Harmonised System (HS) produced by the Customs Cooperation Council. 
The HS forms the basis by which goods are encoded, trade statistics are developed 
                                                                                                                                            
countries that had an average life expectancy of 78.3 years (World Bank development data, 2005).  
6 COTECNA database offers trade supervision services – one of which is the valuation and tariff code 
classification of tradable goods. This database contains fewer countries than comparable sources but it 
has more up-to-date data and therefore was used to provide the most up-to-date data possible for the 
reader, however, for consistency and comparability with Laing and Olcay’s study we used their data set 
for all econometric analysis.  
7 Laing, Richard and Muge Olcay (2005), “Pharmaceutical Tariffs: What Is Their Effect on Prices, 
Protection of Local Industry and Revenue Generation?” (study, Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights, Innovation and Public Health, World Health Organization, Geneva, May 2005), available at: 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/studies/tariffs/en/ (accessed December 18, 2005). 3 
 
and from which the customs and excise authorities in various countries compile their 
tariffs.
8 
The study analysed items classified at the 6-digit level of the Harmonised 
System. This is done so that a sufficiently broad level of disaggregation is obtained. 
Any higher level of disaggregation would have jeopardised the comparability between 
countries and any lower disaggregation would not have correctly identified items 
listed on the EDL.  
Pharmaceutical goods are classified in either Chapter 29 or Chapter 30 of the 
Harmonised System (HS). Goods classified in Chapter 29 are the basic organic 
compounds used in the manufacture of pharmaceutical products.
9 Goods classified in 
Chapter 30 are the manufactured pharmaceutical products.  The Chapter 29 tariffs are 
likely to benefit producers in countries that have domestic medicine manufacturing 
capacity. Many developing countries do not have this; however others, such as India, 
Brazil and Thailand, are among the world’s largest and most successful drug 
manufacturers and producers of active pharmaceutical ingredients.   
There are approximately 27 HS 6-digit headings corresponding to products 
used in the treatment of the major communicable diseases. In addition the study 
includes 3 additional headings, which cover items such as bandages and gauze strips 
as well as medicine boxes (see Annex 2).  
The tariff data was obtained from the International Customs Tariff Bureau 
(ICTB), which has the advantage of listing sales tax and value added tax rates for 
goods examined.  A disadvantage of the ICTB database is that it does not contain data 
on the value of each good imported to each country, which would provide a system of 
weighting the import tariffs.  Our analysis based on the ICTB data was therefore a 
simple average of the tariffs levied on the items in question.  Where possible, we have 
updated our original data by drawing on the COTECNA database, which contains 
more up to date information, however, for consistency and comparability with Laing 
and Olcay’s study we used their data set for all econometric analysis. 
 
                                                 
8 There are 23 major sections of the HS, containing a total of 98 chapters which have 1241 main 4-
figure headings. Theses headings are further divided into approximately 5000 subheadings or codes. 
The headings and subheadings in the HS are mandatory and cannot be changed. However, each 
national authority can extend the codes and add any subdivisions, which it may find necessary. 
9 Certain chemicals are included in the Chapter 29 classifications that have no pharmaceutical 4 
 
In their paper, Laing and Olcay (2005) make use of the UN’s World Integrated Trade 
Solutions (WITS) database, which has the advantage of listing the value of goods 
traded for each HS code.  This allows Laing and Olcay to weight their tariff data 
according to the value of goods imported by a country.  A danger of this approach 
however, is that it may underestimate the impact of a certain tariff on medicine 
importation and therefore on access.   
For instance, if Drug A carries a tariff of 50% and, due to this high tariff is 
rarely imported and Drug B carries a tariff of 10% and is imported in large quantities, 
the 10% tariff will receive a greater weighting than the 50% tariff.  While this may 
provide an accurate picture of the average tariff rates applied in that country, it may 
underestimate the damage done, in denying people access to medicines, by those 
tariffs. 
However a comparison of the weighted and simple average tariffs shows that 
there is in fact little difference between the two. With regards to active ingredients the 
difference between the weighted and simple averages is 0.02%. With regards to 
finished products the difference between the weighted average and simple averages is 
0.36%. It is therefore not clear that weighting tariffs according to the value of imports 
adds greatly to the analysis. 
In order to present as comprehensive a picture as possible of the import tariffs, 
taxes and other duties on medicines and other medical equipment, we have presented 
our original data along with unweighted and weighted WITS tariff data. 
In some cases, countries have made changes to their tariff regimes, which 
while reported in the media, are not reflected in either the WITS database or the ICTB 
database. Wherever possible, we have tried to update our data to reflect the most 
recent changes to the tariff regimes, but where we have not been able to verify media 
reports, we have utilised the WITS database tariff rates. 
 
3. State-Imposed Barriers to Drug Access  
Many factors determine the price of a medicine in different countries.  First, 
domestic healthcare and pricing policies, as well as market size, the degree of 
competition and the extent to which the government protects the intellectual property 
                                                                                                                                            
application. 5 
 
of patented drugs often determine the price at which the manufacturer sells his 
product. Along with these factors, the mark-up that distributors and retailers make can 
greatly influence the price of a medicine to the patient.  
However, as we discuss below, the various campaigns to lower the price of 
medicines and improve access to medicines have placed little emphasis on the state-
imposed barriers to access. The import tariffs, duties and taxes that various 
governments impose can increase the price of medicines significantly. In addition to 
these taxes, there are several non-tariff barriers, such as lengthy registration periods 
for medicines and onerous requirements to clear customs. 
Table 1 details the average import tariffs for 53 countries based on our original 
working paper Taxed to Death as well as tariff rates according to the WITS database 
used by Laing and Olcay (2005).  Table 2 in this paper details the additional taxes and 
duties often imposed by national governments.   
 
Import tariffs 
As Table 1 shows, there are wide variations in the levels of import tariffs 
imposed by the 53 countries in our study.  Our original analysis in Taxed to Death 
found a wide range of import tariffs for the 53 countries that we examined.  Our 
updated data show that for Chapter 29 (organic chemicals) and Chapter 30 
(pharmaceuticals including API, completed medicines, bandages, gauze etc) only four 
countries, Brunei, Malaysia, Madagascar and Costa Rica had zero tariffs.  Slightly 
over 50% of countries maintained tariffs of between 0% and 5% and just over 20% 
maintained tariffs of between 5% and 10%.  Our analysis found that 7 out of the 53 
countries examined (or 13%) maintained tariffs of between 10 and 15% and only 2 
countries, India and Morocco imposed tariffs higher than 15%.  
In several respects, our data is consistent with that used by Laing and Olcay 
(2005) from the UN WITS database.  Laing and Olcay’s analysis finds that for active 
pharmaceutical ingredient (HS Code 3003), 41% of countries (61 out of 151) had zero 
import tariffs, while 26% had tariffs between 0 and 5%, 22% had tariffs between 5.1 
and 10%, 9% had tariffs between 10.1 and 20% and 2% (or only 3 countries) had 
tariffs greater than 20%.
10 
                                                 
10 The inclusion of Chapter 29 products as well as bandages, gauze and other medical products 
probably accounts for the lower proportion of zero tariff countries in our analysis as compared to Laing 6 
 
Laing and Olcay (2005) examine completed pharmaceuticals (HS Code 3004) 
separately and find that slightly fewer (60 countries out of 151) maintained zero 
tariffs for these goods.  According to the WITS database, 25% of countries maintain 
tariffs between 0 and 5% for these goods, 21% maintain tariffs between 5.1 and 10%, 
13% maintain tariffs between 10.1 and 20% and only 2 countries, India and Iran, had 
tariffs greater than 20%. 
The WTO Pharmaceutical Agreement, an outcome of the Uruguay Round, led 
to reciprocal elimination of import tariffs on around seven thousand pharmaceutical 
products.  However, only 22 countries are part of this agreement, and many 




Import Tariffs – Simple Average and Weighted Averages 
 
 
Country  Bate et al. 
Simple 
Average of Ch 























Brunei  0  0 0 0  0 0
Malaysia (ASEAN)  0  0 0 0  0 0
Madagascar  0  0 0 0  0 0
Costa Rica  0  2.5 2.5 2.5  2.5 0
Botswana (SACU)  0.71  0 0 0  0 0
Lesotho (SACU)  0.71  0 n.d. 0  0 0
Namibia (SACU)  0.71  0 0 0  0 0
South Africa (SACU)  0.71  0 0 0  0 0
Swaziland (SACU)  0.71  0 0 0  0 0
Honduras   0.83  0 0 0  0 0
Mozambique  0.88  0 0 0  0 0
El Salvador (AC)  1  0 0 5  5 0
Myanmar (ASEAN)  1.18  1.5 1.5 1.5  1.5 0
Benin (WAEMU)  1.62  0 0 0  0 0
Cote d’Ivoire 
(WAEMU) 
1.62  0 0 0  0 0
Guinea Bissau 
(WAEMU) 
1.62  1.6 n.d. 0  0 0
Mali (WAEMU)  1.62  0 0 0  0 0
                                                                                                                                            
and Olcay (2005) and for the differences in average tariffs.   
11 The signatories of the WTO Pharmaceutical Agreement are 15 member states of the European 
Union, the US, Switzerland, Japan, Canada, Norway, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Macau-
China.   7 
 
Niger (WAEMU)  2.38  0 0 0  0 0
Dominican Rep.  2.42  3 3 3  3 0
Burkina Faso 
(WAEMU) 
2.5  0 0 0  0 0
Philippines (ASEAN)  2.54  3 3 3.84  3.95 3
Senegal (WAEMU)  2.5  0 0 0  0 0
Togo (WAEMU)  2.5  0 0 0  0 0
Vietnam (ASEAN)  2.78  0.08 0.83 5.71  3.99 0
Lebanon  2.79  5 5 5  5 5
Cambodia (ASEAN)  3.5  0 0 0  0 0
Indonesia (ASEAN)  4.13  5 5 5  5 2.5
Cameroon  5  5 5 5  5 5
Central African Rep.  5  5 5 5  5 5
Chad  5  5 5 5  5 5
Congo, Rep.   5  5 5 5  5 5
Tanzania (EACU)  5.45  10 10 10  10 10
Bangladesh  5.63  7.45 5.73 9.63  6.43 0
Ecuador (AC)  6.16  5 5 5.64  4.43 5
China  6.75  5.6 5.67 4.41  5.24 3
Laos (ASEAN)  6.59  10 10 10  10 5
Zimbabwe  7.49  2.76 6 17.6  5.83 0
Congo  Dem Rep.  8.10  10 10 15.45  11.90 10
Peru (AC)  8.26  12 12 12  12 12
Nigeria  8.41  20 20 20  20 20
Algeria  9.48  5 5 5.24  6.79 0
Brazil  9.6  9.51 10.35 10.31  7.28 2.65
Ghana   9.77  10 10 4.73  9.29 10
Bolivia (AC)  10  10 8.33 10  8.57 10
Colombia (AC)  10  5 5 8.04  7.61 5
Kenya (EACU)  10  6.86 2.08 5.29  1.79 0
Uganda (EACU)  10  0 0 0  0 0
Venezuela (AC)  10  9.93 9 9.2  8.33 5
Pakistan  11.12  10 10 13.63  10.82 10
Thailand (ASEAN)  11.1  10 10 18.01  11.43 0
Mexico   11.8  14.67 16.07 6.91  10.52 8.5
India  16  35 33 30  35 30
Morocco  18.30  23.74 29.38 12.4  17.81 2.5
 
AC – Andean Community 
ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
EACU – East African Community Customs Union   
SACU – Southern African Customs Union 
WAEMU – West African Economic and Monetary Union 
 
 
Some regional trade groups, such as the Southern African Customs Union, have 
made significant progress in reducing or removing import tariffs. Many other African 
countries maintain very low or negligible import tariffs on completed pharmaceuticals 8 
 
and on the Chapter 29 intermediate pharmaceutical products.   
Some countries however are moving in the opposite direction.  On January 1, 
2005, both Kenya and Uganda imposed 10% import tariffs on all imported medicines 
in line with East African Customs Union protocols.  The harm that these newly 
imposed tariffs will cause is likely to be considerable.  The Kenyan government failed 
to meet its target of treating 45,000 patients on antiretroviral therapy at the end of 
2004, treating only 24,000.  The increased cost of treatment adds another hurdle to the 
government’s already ambitious aim of treating 95,000 by the end of 2005.   
According to Dr Patrick Orege, director of the National AIDS Control Council, the 
tariff issue is “…problematic – this increase should be addressed urgently, so that we 
can meet our goals.”
12  Kenya subsequently unilaterally reversed the 10% import tariff 
decision. Currently it is unclear as to whether the other East African Customs Union 
countries have also reduced their medicine import tariffs.  Table 1 retains Kenya’s 
import tariff at 10% as we have not been able to confirm the precise level to which 
import tariffs have been reduced. 
The DRC’s import tariffs on completed pharmaceuticals varies from 10% on most 
products, to 15% on any medicines containing penicillin, to a high of 18.3% on a 
range of products, such as antidepressants, anaesthetics, cough and cold preparations 
and diuretics.  The Chapter 29 tariffs are fixed at 5% for all goods, resulting in an 
average import tariff of 8.1%.   
India recently reduced its import tariffs of 30% on completed pharmaceuticals, 
vaccines and 35% on API to 16%.  This change is not reflected in Laing and Olcay’s 
study but the newer rate is given in this study.   
Zimbabwe, which is currently facing a healthcare crisis and an average life-
expectancy of only 33 years, imposes a 5% tariff on most medicines, although it does 
have a zero tariff for vaccines.
13  Zimbabwe’s tariffs for adhesive dressings and 
bandages, however is set at 20%, perhaps in an effort to protect a local industry from 
international competition. Laing and Olcay (2005) weighted average of import tariffs 
imposed by Zimbabwe on completed pharmaceuticals are approximately 10% higher 
than the average tariff calculated in our original working paper, Taxed to Death.  
                                                 
12 “Kenya; New Tax Jeopardises HIV Treatment Access” Africa News, February 10, 2005. 
13 See Bate and Tren (2005), “Despotism and Disease: A Report into the Health Situation of Zimbabwe 
and its Probable Impact on the Region’s Health,” Africa Fighting Malaria, available at: 
http://www.fightingmalaria.org/pdfs/Zimbabwe_health_hires.pdf (accessed February 10, 2006). 9 
 
 
Sales Taxes and Other Duties 
Another source of government revenue and yet another price inflator of 
pharmaceuticals and other medical devices are sales taxes, value added taxes and 
other duties and port charges. Some governments have a zero value added tax rating 
for medicines. However, many do charge VAT, and the rates range from 0% in 
Brunei to 19% in Peru. India maintains a complex set of sales taxes that vary from 
state to state and recently introduced VAT. Officially the VAT rate on medicines 
should be 4% (as depicted in Table 2 below) however many states continue to impose 
the old sales taxes that VAT was supposed to replace. This means that in some cases 
medicines could be taxed twice, increasing the cost of medicines by well over 10%.  
In recent years, the South African government passed draconian drug pricing 
regulations in an effort to reduce the price of medicines to private consumers, yet the 
government maintains a 14% VAT on all medicines.
14 Many countries also impose 
other charges and duties.   For instance, several countries such as Benin and Guinea- 
Bissau impose a community solidarity levy of 1%.  Kenya imposes a pre-shipment 
inspection fee on all imports valued at over US$5,000.  According to the US Trade 
Representative, “Kenya’s customs procedures are detailed and rigidly implemented, 
often leading to delays in clearance of both imports and exports.”
15   
In addition to the taxes listed above, certain countries impose additional taxes 
and duties for which we have not accounted.  For instance, Lesotho, with a life 
expectancy of just 36.3 years in 2002, imposes a 10% withholding tax on all 
medicines.  In implementing this tax, the state withholds 10% of the value to be paid 
to the supplier. In anticipating this, the supplier normally increases the total amount 
invoiced by 10%.





                                                 
14 The South African government has been challenged at the highest court in the land, the 
Constitutional Court, over its attempts to control drug prices and regulate the mark-up that pharmacists 
may make. 
15 United States Trade Representative (USTR), “Kenya: Foreign Trade Barriers,” Available at:   
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/2005_NTE_Report/asset_up
load_file747_7480.pdf (accessed February 17, 2006).  
16 Pers comm. Matebele Sefali, National Drug Service Organisation, Lesotho. March 16, 2005. 10 
 
Table 2 
Taxes and Duties Applied to Chapter 29 and Chapter 30 
Products, Selected Countries 
 
Country  VAT  Other 
Taxes 
Duty  Combined 
Brunei   0.0 0.0 
Morocco  0.0 0.0 
India  4.0 4.0 
Myanmar  5.0 5.0 
Lebanon  5.0 5.0 
Mozambique   5.0 US $ 50 6.0 
Thailand   7.0 7.0 
Senegal  5.8 2.0 7.8 
Nigeria   5.0 2.9 7.9 
Namibia   8.0 8.0 
Botswana   10.0 10.0 
Cambodia   10.0 10.0 
Colombia   10.0 10.0 
Indonesia   10.0 10.0 
Laos   10.0 10.0 
Lesotho   10.0 10.0 
Philippines  10.0 10.0 
Viet Nam  10.0 10.0 
Mali  9.0 2.5 11.5 
Algeria  11.5 11.5 
Burkina Faso  9.0 3.5 12.5 
Ghana  12.5 12.5 
Honduras  12.0 0.5 12.5 
Congo, Republic of  18.7 18.7 
El Salvador  13.0 13.0 
Madagascar  8.2 5.0 13.2 
Mexico  12.5 0.8 13.3 
Ecuador  14.0 14.0 
South Africa  14.0 14.0 
Swaziland  14.0 14.0 
Bolivia  13.0 1.9 14.9 
Bangladesh  15.0 15.0 
Malaysia   5.0 5.0 
Pakistan  15.0 15.0 
Venezuela  15.0 15.0 
Zimbabwe  15.0 15.0 
Togo  9.8 5.25 16.1 
China  17.0 17.0 
Côte d'Ivoire  15 2.0 17.0 
Dominican Republic  15.0 2.0 17.0 
Guinea-Bissau  15.0 2.0 17.0 11 
 
Benin  15 2.0 17.5 




Chad  18.7 18.7 
Brazil  18.0 1.0 19.0 
Peru  17.0 3.14 20.1 
Uganda  17.0 4.0 21.0 
Niger  6.15 18.95 25.2 
Tanzania, U. Rep. of  20.0 6.2 26.2 
Kenya  16.0 11.8 27.8 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 
the 
18.7 12.7 31.4 
Costa Rica  10.7  
•  For Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad and the Republic of Congo: There is a 5 
percent duty on basic necessities, 10 percent on raw materials and capital goods, 20 percent on 
intermediate and miscellaneous goods, and 30 percent on consumer goods. Furthermore, there 
is an 18.7 value added tax on CIF + duty.  It is not clear how these countries classify Chapter 
29 and 30 products. 
*  In April 2005 India introduced a VAT of 4% on medicines.  Many states in India however 
continue to charge VAT as well as the erstwhile sales taxes which could increase the cost of 
medicines by as much as 30%.  
 12 
 
Tariffs and Government Revenue  
Laing and Olcay (2005) compare the revenue raised from pharmaceutical 
import tariffs and overall GDP and find that it “can be considered to be an 
insignificant amount in national economies.”  It would perhaps be more logical to 
measure the revenue raised from these tariffs against total government expenditure.  It 
is perhaps also instructive to compare the revenue raised from tariffs with total public 
healthcare expenditure, in case such revenue was hypothecated to such expenditure.   
Annex 1 contains tables detailing import tariffs as a percentage of government 
revenue and healthcare budget.  For most countries where reliable data could be 
obtained, the revenue raised from pharmaceutical tariffs as measured by Laing and 
Olcay(2005) represent either zero % or less than 1% of total government revenue.  In 
only one country, Democratic Republic of Congo, do revenues from pharmaceutical 
tariffs form more than 1% of government revenue. In four countries, Ecuador 
(1.29%), Lebanon (2.48%), Nigeria (2.49%) and Democratic Republic of Congo 
(8.24%) do pharmaceutical import tariffs generate an amount equivalent to more than 
1% of the total healthcare budget.   
Any revenue statistics or information on government programs emanating 
from the Democratic Republic of Congo should be viewed with scepticism as to all 
intents and purposes it is a failed and chaotic state.  However, it is clear that at least 
for some countries, the revenues raised from import tariffs on pharmaceuticals are 
likely to constitute a non-trivial portion of the overall budget.  In some countries 
therefore, opposition to reducing or removing these tariffs is likely to arise out of 
concern for lost revenues.  
It should be borne in mind that the revenues generated from all import tariffs 
provide poor country governments with much needed foreign exchange, which in turn 
is used to purchase other imported goods and services. Any attempt to limit the 
number of sources from which foreign exchange can be earned is likely to be resisted 
by Ministries of Finance.  
To help these countries move to more efficient and more equitable means of 
raising revenue, bilateral and multilateral agencies such as from US Government 
(State Dept., USAID) or World Bank and OECD could provide technical assistance in 
this regard.   
 13 
 
Tariffs, taxes and access to medicines 
 
As Table 3 shows, there are enormous differences between the health status of 
citizens of the countries examined and their access to medicines. As we have already 
explained, there are several factors that influence the price at which a medicine sells 
in any particular country, as well as a variety of reasons for access to medicine to 
differ from country to country.   
India, which until recently maintained the world’s highest import tariffs for 
medicines has over 5 million people living with HIV/AIDS.
17  Access to antiretroviral 
therapy is extremely low, with only 20,000 to 36,000 receiving treatment.
18 Even the 
most basic treatment for preventable and curable diseases is out of reach of most 
Indians.  According to the United Nations, only 35% of the Indian population has 
access to essential medicines, yet this might be increased had the country removed 
import tariffs on Chapter 29 and 30 goods many years ago. 
 
Table 3  
Overall Taxation Rates, Health Indicators and Access to 
Essential Medicines (2002) 
 
 



































               
Algeria  0.1 (03)  Nd  100  2*  95-100  69.5  21 
Bangladesh  Nd  Nd  95  40**  50-79  61.1  21.5 
Benin 
(WAEMU) 
1.9  5.1  100 (02)  10 697*  50-79  50.7  18.6 
Bolivia (AC)  Nd  Nd  86  378 (00)  50-79  63.7  24.9 
Botswana 
(SACU) 
37.3  23.9  100  48 704  80-94  41.4  10.85 
Brazil  0.7  100  25  344 (00)  0-49  68.0  28.6 
Brunei  <0.1  Nd  100  Nd  95-100  76.2  0 
                                                 
17 Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, UNAIDS (2004), “UNAIDS 2004 Report on the 
Global AIDS Epidemic,” available at: http://www.unaids.org/bangkok2004/report.html (accessed 
January 10. 2006). 
18 World Health Organization (2004), “The 3x5 Progress Report”, available at: 





4.2  2.5  100  619  50-79  45.8  15 
Cambodia 
(ASEAN) 
2.6  5.0  100  476  0-49  57.4  13.5 




13.5  Nd  75  2 207*  50-49  39.8  23.7 
Chad  4.8  Nd  98  197*  0-49  44.7  23.7 
China  0.1  8.4  78  1  80-94  70.9  23.5 
Colombia 
(AC) 
0.7  Nd  14  250 (00)  80-94  72.1  20 
Congo, Dem 
Rep 
4.2  0.8  70  2 960*  Nd  41.4  39.5 
Congo, Rep  4.9  2.4  20  5 880 (00) 50-79  48.3  23.7 
Costa Rica  0.6  Nd  84  42 (00)  95-100  78.0  10.7 
Cote d’Ivoire 
(WAEMU) 
7.0  4.5  74  12 152 
(00) 
80-94  41.2  18.6 
Dominican 
Republic 
1.7  2.6  40  6 (00)  50-79  66.7  19.4 
Ecuador (AC)  0.3  Nd  37  728  0-49  70.7  20.1 
El Salvador  0.7  30.3  100  11  80-94  70.6  14 
Ghana  3.1  0.2  100  15 344  0-49  57.8  22.3 
Guinea Bissau 
(WAEMU) 
Nd  Nd  20  2 421*  0-49  45.2  18.6 
Honduras  1.8  17.8  100  541  0-49  68.8  13.5 
India  0.9  4.2  52  7  0-49  63.7  20 
Indonesia 
(ASEAN) 
0.1  22.5  98  920  80-94  66.6  14.1 
Kenya 
(EACU) 
6.7  3.1  100  545  0-49  45.2  37.8 
Laos (ASEAN) 0.1  Nd  77  759  50-79  54.3  16.6 
Lebanon  0.1  Nd  100  Nd  80-94  73.5  7.8 
Lesotho 
(SACU) 
28.9  Nd  100  0*  80-94  36.3  10.8 
Madagascar  1.7  0.0  100  Nd  50-79  53.4  13.2 
Malaysia 
(ASEAN) 
0.4  67.5  100  57  50-79  73.0  5 
Mali 
(WAEMU) 
1.9  3.4  68  4 008*  50-79  48.5  13.1 
Mexico  0.3  100  70  8  80-94  73.3  25.1 
Morocco  0.03  Nd      50-79  68.5  18.3 
Mozambique  12.2  1.1  100  18 115 
(00) 
50-79  38.5  7 +$50 
Myanmar 
(ASEAN)  
1.2  Nd  88  224  50-79  57.2  6.1 
Namibia 
(SACU) 




1.2  Nd  81  1 693 (98) 50-79  46.0  27.5 
Nigeria  5.4  2.3  55  30  0-49  51.6  16.3 
Pakistan  0.1  Nd  45  58  50-79  60.8  26.1 
Peru (AC)  0.5  23.8  100  258  50-79  69.7  28.4 
Philippines 
(ASEAN) 
<0.1  7.1  98  15  50-79  69.8  12.5 
Senegal 
(WAEMU) 
0.8  22.9  100  11 925  50-79  52.7  10.3 
South Africa 
(SACU) 
21.5  2.7  98  143  80-94  48.8  14.7 
Swaziland 
(SACU) 
38.8  9.6  100***  2 835  95-100  35.7  14.7 
Tanzania  8.8  0.5  100****  1 207*  50-79  43.5  31.6 
Thailand 
(ASEAN) 
1.5  12.2  100  130  95-100  69.1  18.1 
Togo 
(WAEMU) 
4.1  0.4  81  7 701 (98) 50-79  49.9  17.6 
Uganda 
(EACU) 
4.1  12.9  100  46  50-79  45.7  31 
Venezuela 
(AC) 
0.7  Nd  88  94  80-94  73.6  25 
Viet Nam 
(ASEAN) 
0.4  35.0  100  95  80-94  69  12.7 





***Four of 15 operational units are not reporting to the National Tuberculosis Control Program on a 
regular basis 
****Country offers additional information on "access" to DOTS services, which it measures in terms 
of distance from health facility: 70% population live within 5 km and 90% within 10 km from a health 
unit. 
± Based on Taxed to Death average tariffs, taxes and other duties. 
Source:  UNDP Human Development Report 2002, 2004 
World Health Organisation, The World Medicines Situation, 2004, Geneva. 
 
Laing and Olcay (2005) critique our use of UN “Access to Medicine” data in 
Taxed to Death.  Though we utilized point estimates of access to medicine in 
estimating the impact of taxes and tariffs, these points are nothing more than arbitrary 
representations of the interval estimates to which the numbers belong.  Thus, directly 
following the methodology of the UN Human Development report, we instead use the 
access data to place countries into ordinal categories: Very low access (0-49 percent, 
low access (50-79 percent), medium (80-94 percent), and good (95-100 percent).   
In an attempt to estimate a quantitative relationship between tariff levels and 16 
 
access to medicine, we utilize tariff data provided by Laing and Olcay (2005). Our 
sample consists of 96 countries with populations greater than 500,000 and a 
classification of low or medium in the 2002 UNHD report.
19  Some countries that 
meet these criteria have been excluded due to dearth of reliable data.  We have also 
excluded the influential outlier Iran from this analysis due to their extraordinary large 
tariff levels.
20  Unsurprisingly, the countries in the sample populate the bottom three 
access to medicine categories, most frequently ‘low’ (see Table 4).   
 
Table 4  
Distribution of Access to Medicine Among Low and Medium 
Developed Countries 
 
Category  Frequency 
Very Low  23 
Low  40 
Medium  23 
High  10 
 
We include several explanatory variables in our model to control for factors 
other than tariffs that influence the probability of being in a particular “Access” 
category (Table 5).We expect all the tariff variables and RURAL to have negative 
coefficients, and GNI02 to have a positive coefficient.  In addition, we expect HEXPR 
to also have a negative coefficient, as higher private expenditures, holding other 
factors constant, may indicate inequities in access to health care that disfavor the 
majority of inhabitants. However, we are uncertain as to the effects of Hexpub. 
 
Table 5 
 Variable Names (Access to Medicine) 
 
Variable Name  Variable Description 
Wavgactive  Weighted average tariff across subcategories of the 
four digit category (3003) for active ingredients in 
pharmaceutical products 
Wavgfnsh  Weighted average tariff across subcategories of the 
four digit category (3004) for  finished 
                                                 
19 For a list of countries as ‘low’ or ‘medium’ in the UNHD report but excluded from the analysis due 
to data issues, see Annex 3. 
20  We discuss the implications of removing this outlier in the results section.   17 
 
pharmaceutical products 
Totwavg  Average of wavgfnsh and wavgactive 
Hexpr  Private Health Expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
(2002) 
Hexpub  Public Health Expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
(2002)
  
Rural  Percentage of Population living in rural areas (2002)
GNI02  GNI per capita in 2002 
Corrupt  Score on Corruption Perceptions Index (high scores 
inversely related to corruption) (2004)
i 
 
Note: i=data drawn from 2004 due to availability  
We limit ourselves to these explanatory variables because the role of other 
factors, such as drug price regulations, is likely to be minor when compared to GNI.  
Additionally we do not have access to comprehensive data on regulations, 
competition within the pharmaceutical industry and market size. 
In Table 5, no year is designated for the tariff variables.  One of the weak 
points of the data taken from Laing and Olcay (2005) is that the year of the tariff level 
measurement is not uniform for all countries.  Therefore, in order to carry out a 
meaningful estimation, we must assume that variation in tariff levels across time 
periods for each observation is extremely small.  Considering that our sample consists 
of tariff data from a small window of time (2000-2004) and tariff rates are generally 
stable,
21 with major changes occurring rarely, we consider this a fairly reasonable 
assumption. To be thorough, however, we must caution the reader that violation of 
this assumption damages the validity of our estimation results.   
 
Estimation 
We use an Ordered Probit model to estimate the relationship between the 
explanatory variables and our ordered dependent variable, Access to Medicine. 
Ordered Probit models are of a general class of estimators designed to handle indexed 
descriptions of a latent continuous variable (Access to Medicine, in this case).
22  
                                                 
21 According to former Australian Trade Ambassador, Alan Oxley, tariffs “are generally not volatile.  
Most Western economies bind their tariffs under the WTO (formally committing not to raise them).  
Many developing countries bind their tariffs at a higher level – typically 30 percent – than the rate at 
which they are actually ‘applied’ – average of applied tariffs in developing countries is 12- 15 percent. 
(For reference average applied tariff in industrialized economies is 4 percent). So most developing 
countries have legal scope to raise tariffs.  They usually only do so when there is an economic crisis.  
Thailand did after the Asian currency crisis. You can safely assume the rates you have are probably 
current.” Pers comm. 2-21-06. 
22 These models are widely used for estimating ordinal dependent variables, and their properties are 18 
 
Interpretation of the coefficients on the explanatory variables is not as straight 
forward as in the linear regression model.  Conceptually, the coefficients can be 
viewed as propensities of being in higher categories.  For positive coefficients, an 
increase in the explanatory variable is associated with an increase in the latent Access 
to Medicine variable. Thus, positive coefficients indicate that all other variables held 
constant, the probability of being in a higher category of the dependent variable 
increases with higher values of the explanatory variable. The reverse is true for 
negative coefficients.
23   
We estimate two models.  In one, we include wavgfnsh and wavgactive (but 
not totwavg) as separate terms in the regression, and in the other, we leave both of 
these variables out and include totwavg.   
 
Results 
Our results in Tables 6 and 7 indicate that tariff weighted averages have a 
statistically significant and negative effect on Access to Medicine when inserted in the 
model as an average of active ingredient and finished product tariffs (i.e. totwavg).  
Computing marginal effects, we find that a one percent increase in totwavg is 
associated with a .013 percent increase in the probability of being in the ‘very low’ 
category, and a .12 decrease in being in the ‘medium’ category. In other words these 
relationships demonstrate strong but relatively small likelihoods of higher tariffs 
being associated with a very significant change – being in the ‘very low’ category of 
access to medicines. And hence a reduction in tariffs is associated with a reversal of 
the above, less likelihood of a country having woefully low access to essential 
medical interventions.  
When inserted into the model separately, the coefficient on wavgactive 
remains negative and significant, but wavgfnsh becomes positive and insignificant.  
The only other statistically significant variables in the model are GNI02 and HEXPR, 
which are respectively positive and negative, as expected. 
The seemingly differing results regarding the tariff variables in both models 
                                                                                                                                            
thoroughly discussed in the standard literature.  We refer the reader to Greene (2003) for a review of 
the estimator’s basic motivation and properties, and Long and Freese (2006) for a thorough treatment 
of estimating ordinal (and related) models in STATA. 
23 We again refer the reader to Greene (2003) and Long and Freese (2006) for a more formal and 
rigorous explanation than given here.   19 
 
may have a less than straightforward interpretation.  Given the statistical significance 
of totwavg in the previous model, the insignificance and unexpected sign of 
wavgfnsh, as well as the unexpectedly large coefficient on wavgfnsh and wavgactive, 
is probably due to problems arising from multicollinearity among wavgfnsh and 
wavgactive.
24 The high degree of correlation (simple r=.872) between the two is 
unsurprising, given that governments tend to set similar tariff levels for closely related 
goods. Unfortunately, teasing out the independent effect of each is difficult when both 
are included like this in the model.  Thus we cannot conclude from these results that it 
is only tariffs on active ingredients that negatively impact access to medicine.   
There are two important notes regarding the sensitivity of these results.  For 
one, while we do not have data on simple averages for finished goods, replacing 
wavgactive with its simple average corollary in the second model has almost no effect 
on the results.  However, the exclusion of Iran does.  When Iran is included, totwavg 
becomes insignificant different from zero, hexpub becomes statistically significant.
25  
Iran, whose 54 percent weighted average tariff for finished products and 100 percent 
weighted average for active ingredients, is markedly above the next highest taxer, 
India (30% and 35% respectively) and the median tariff rate for the sample (3.42 
percent).  Combined with Iran’s relatively high score for Access to Medicine 
(Medium), this observation has enough influence to dramatically increase the standard 
error calculation for totwavg (as well as wavgfnsh and wavgactive).   
To keep Iran in the estimation, and properly account for possible nonlinearity 
at extremely large values for totwavg, we estimate a third model that includes a 
quadratic totwavg term and the Iran observation (Table 8).  Totwavg and towavgsq 
are both significant, but estimating the same quadratic model excluding Iran drops 
both terms from statistical significance.  This exercise serves primarily to demonstrate 
the influence of Iran’s high observation on the estimation results, though it might 
suggest the possibility of decreasing marginal effect of tariffs at extremely high 
levels.  However, it would be highly presumptuous to fashion ideas about the effect of 
tariffs from the uniqueness of Iran’s high tariff levels alone.
26  
                                                 
24 Judge et al. (1988), among others, discuss more thoroughly the problems with interpreting coefficient 
estimates in the presence of multicollinearity. 
25 Aside from a decrease in the magnitude of totwavg, coefficient estimates remain stable. 
26 Lest we be accused of ‘rigging’ our results, we stress that the estimates given in Table 8 demonstrate 




Access to Medicine with a Combined Tariff Variable 
 
     
  Coef.  Std. Err. 
     
gni02  .0004451  .0001245*** 
totwavg  -.0487805  .0249629** 
hexpub  .1305626  .0997555 
hexpr  -.173003  .0823335** 
rural  .0058439  .0078305 
corrupt  .0663597  .1346674 
N=94 
Significance Levels: ***=.01, **=.05, *=.10 
 
Table 7  
Access to Medicine with Separate Tariff Variables 
 
  Coef.  Std. Err. 
     
gni02  .0004857  .0001284*** 
wavgfnsh  .0741729  .0520966 
wavgactive -.1177935  .0496327** 
hexpub  .1012494  .1011554 
hexpr  -.1700761  .0827509** 
rural  .0070208  .0079177 
corrupt  .062901  .1357761 
N=94 




                                                                                                                                            





 Access to Medicine with Quadratic Combined Tariff 
Variable, Including Iran 
 
  Coef.  Std. Err. 
     
gni02  .0004531  .0001252*** 
totwavg  -.0620272  .0305299** 
totwavgsq  .0009294  .0004343** 
hexpub  .1342746  .0997864 
hexpr  -.1770456  .0823616** 
rural  .0056399  .0078332 
corrupt  .0603393  .1350752 
N=95 






Table 9  
Marginal Effects of Independent Variables  
on Access to Medicine 
 
  Prob(=Very 
Low) 
Prob(=Low) Prob(=Medium) Prob(=High) 
        
gni02  -.0001*** -.0001  .0001***  .0001*** 
totwavg  .0130* .0042  -.0120*  -.0052* 
hexpr  .0460** .0149 -.0427**  -.0183* 
hexpub  -.0347 -.0113  .0322  .0138 
rural  -.0015 -.0005  .0014  .0006 
corrupt  -.0178 -.0057  .0163  .0070 




In addition to examining tariffs on various medicines, we take special note of 
import tariffs on vaccines.  We do this not only because immunization is a crucial 
public health issue, but also because we can quantify the relationship between vaccine 
tariffs and vaccine consumption with much greater ease and reliability.  Indeed, 22 
 
‘access to medicine’ is inherently difficult to measure with precision.  Immunization 
coverage, however, is actively measured by national governments and the World 
Health Organization.   
Our vaccine tariff data reveals that 57% of the countries in our sample, which 
consists of 96 countries with a population greater than 500,000, classified as low or 
medium in the 2002 UNHD report and for which complete data is available, have zero 
tariff levels (see Table 10).
27  Though the mean tariff in the sample was only 2.9%, 
fifteen countries have a tariff of five percent and nine countries have a ten percent 




Table 10  
Distribution of Vaccine Tariff Levels 
 
Tariff Level (percent)  Frequency 
0  55 
0-5  26 
5.1-10  11 
10.1-15  2 
15.1-30  2 
 
 
As before, we assume that the tariff rates remain constant throughout the period of our 
analysis (2000 – 2004). 
 
Model 
Utilizing vaccine tariff and immunization coverage data enables us to detect 
the impact of tariffs in a more precise manner than our access to medicine data allow.  
We expect vaccine tariffs to affect coverage rates in a manner similar to tariffs on 
medicine.  However, in the case of immunizations, individuals typically do not 
consume vaccines from their own budget.  For the countries in our sample, 
immunization campaigns are usually headed by national governments, in coordination 
with international development agencies.
29   
                                                 
27 We take our tariff data from Laing and Olcay (2005), who report no differences in simple and 
weighted averages despite positive import levels. 
28 India, which has a stated tariff of 30 percent, is included in this sample.  Laing and Olcay (2005) 
claim that this tariff is not collected, but we were unable to confirm that this was the case in 2002.   
29 World Health Organisation (2002), “State of the World’s Vaccines and Immunization” WHO, 
Geneva. Available from http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/pub_sowvi_en.pdf (accessed January 23 
 
In general, higher costs for vaccines raise the total cost of immunization 
campaigns.  We suspect that in some cases, this cost may be substantial enough to 
affect the number of people that these campaigns reach.  Clearly, given the somewhat 
centralized nature of immunization campaigns in developing countries, the effect of 
these tariffs are conditional on other factors.  For this reason, we include the variable 
CORRUPT, which contains data from the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
compiled by Transparency International, in our model.
30  We expect CORRUPT to be 
positively correlated to tariff rates, as higher values indicate ‘cleaner’ government, 
which are expected to both be more responsive to the needs of its citizens and more 
likely to receive (and use) donor support.  DOCTORS and POPDEN (population 
density) reflect the difficulty of administering immunization campaigns, and we 
expect both variables to have a positive coefficient as well.   
We construct two linear models identical in all but the choice of dependent 
variable.  In one, we use the (DPT3) vaccine, and in the other the Measles containing 




3 Percentage of Target Population Immunized With 
Third Dose of Diphtheria, Pertussis, and Tetanus Vaccine, 2004
=Percentage of Target Population Immunized With 










                                                                                                                                            
15, 2006). 
30 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) compiled by Transparency International. Available at: 




=Gross National Income per Capita, 2004
=6 Digit Vaccine Tariff Rate (varies)










Note:  Tariff Data from Laing and Oclay (2005) do not indicate any difference between 
simple and weighted tariff avergages for the countries
ians Per 1000 People (2004)
Population Per km  (2004) i POPDEN =




We employ quantile regression to estimate these models. This estimation 
technique is more efficient than OLS when the error terms are non-normally 
distributed, as they are here.  Both visual inspection and a Shapiro-Wilk test for 
normality confirm that the residuals in this regression are not normal, which we 
attribute to negative skewness in the dependent variables.
31 
32 This skewness is seen 
readily in Table 10, which shows a high concentration of the data at or around zero. 
Quantile regression is actually very similar to least squares regression in 
conception, though the former’s focus on the conditional median (in lieu of the mean) 
makes it a more attractive estimator in the presence of non-normality.  While OLS 
estimates the marginal effect of an explanatory variable at the mean of the dependent 
variable, quantile regression estimates this marginal effect at various points along the 
distribution of the dependent variable. Methodologically, in the simple case of median 
regression, the estimator is simply minimizing the sum of the absolute value of the 
error terms (referred to varyingly as a “least absolute error”, “least absolute residual” 
or “minimum absolute deviation” estimator).  At other quantiles, the errors are 
weighted accordingly before fitting a sum-of-errors minimizing line.
33 
There is considerable debate regarding the proper method of estimating 
                                                 
31 Shapiro-Wilk p-value: .00008 
32 Attempts to alleviate the skewness by reflecting the data and taking a logarithmic transformation 
were ineffective.   
33 Please refer to Koenker and Basset (1978), Judge et al. (1988), Buchinsky (1998) and Koenker and 
Hallock (2001) for a more rigorous explanation of the methodology behind quantiles.  25 
 
standard errors for quantile regression parameters.  Estimating standard errors using 
the method proposed by Koenker and Bassett (1982) and Rogers (1993), which is the 
default method in STATA, is often unreliable in the presence of heteroskedastic error 
terms, so we also present bootstrapped results.
34    
 
Results 
Table 11 presents estimation results with MCV immunization coverage as the 
dependent variable, and Table 12 presents results with DPT3 immunization cover as 
the dependent variable.    
All of the variables in our model have expected coefficients, with DOCTORS 
positively correlated and statistically significant at the 1% level for virtually all 
quantiles and standard error estimations.
35  Further, the negative correlation of 
TARIFF with immunization coverage is robust to all quantiles and both types of 
vaccines.  At the middle quantiles of both the MCV and DPT3 regression, the 
relationship is significantly different from zero under both methods of calculating the 
standard error.  TARIFF appears significant at other places in the regression, but the 
differences between the MCV and DPT3 in the regressions and variations in standard 
error calculations limit our ability to make further generalizations.
36  
As expected the magnitude of TARIFF is not large (between -.6 and -.8 were 
significantly different from zero) in comparison to variables such as DOCTORS and 
CORRUPT.
37  Unexpectedly, however, GNI04 did not appear significant in the 
equation.  The role of international donors in immunization campaigns may mute the 
effect of variations in GNI per capita among less developed countries on coverage 
levels. 
Though some of the shortcomings in our data and the difficulty in estimating 
precise standard errors limit our ability to interpret the statistical significance levels of 
the variables presented here, the difference between the DPT3 and measles 
estimations in this regard nevertheless may appear surprising.  According to Younger 
                                                 
34 See Koenker and Hallock (2001) for a comparison of methods to estimate standard errors. 
35 The estimated signs of the coefficients are robust to variation in specification, including alternative 
means to compensate for the skewness in the dependent variable. 
36 Interquantile regression coefficients do not reveal statistically significant different impacts of the 
explanatory variables across the quantiles. 
37 Interpretation of the coefficients is the same in quantile regression as in OLS.  Thus, at the median 
conditional quantile of DTP3 vaccine coverage, for example, a one percent increase in the vaccine 
tariff rate decreases coverage by .735 percentage points, while an additional physician (per 1000 26 
 
(2001), however, these two variables also produce different results when used in 
economic growth equations as proxies for more general health status variables.   
Perhaps some of this difference may be attributed to the contrasting administrations of 
the two vaccines: while measles is given once, DPT3 represents the third in a series of 
doses.   
 
Table 11 and 12 
Estimation Results 
 
MCV          DPT3     














.10 Pseudo R2 =    0.2877      .10 Pseudo R2 =    0.3173   
tariff  -1.020  0.7959966  0.6543906    -1.525  .7724317**  .7980456* 
gni04a  0.003  0.0019619  0.0033938    0.003  0.0031551  0.0031853 
popden  0.025  0.0179643  0.036049    0.025  0.0233489  0.0280448 
corrupt  3.465  4.436569  4.818335    4.969  2.276146**  5.500967 
doctors  8.575  2.268028***  4.34237**    6.205  2.283767***  4.378142 
_cons  42.954  15.14136***  18.33114**    41.069  9.333565***  21.6654* 
               
Quantile 
(.25) 
.25 Pseudo R2 =    0.3201    .25 Pseudo R2 =    0.2804 




0.4329454  -0.6778915    -0.665  0.5123128  .3887701* 
gni04a  0.001  0.001341  0.0008062    0.002  .0008814*  0.0010862 
popden  0.013  0.01055  0.0125681    0.020  .0094812**  .0112273* 
corrupt  3.448  2.347493  3.447993    5.640  1.792609***  2.561764** 
doctors  7.911  1.552696***  7.911202***    4.488  1.765193***  1.908258** 
_cons  56.517  7.083161***  56.51729***    53.710  6.732673***  8.133589*** 
               
Quantile 
(.4) 
.40 Pseudo R2 =    0.3132    .40 Pseudo R2 =    0.2591 
tariff  -0.875  0.4031576**  .3459299***    -0.643  .3961236*  .356912* 
gni04a  0.001  0.0010591  0.000963    0.001  0.0008844  0.0011296 
popden  0.008  0.010517  0.0090501    0.015  .0052238***  0.0109195 
corrupt  3.996  1.622692**  2.015838**    5.146  1.16633***  2.397763** 
doctors  6.886  1.413854***  1.614392***    5.666  1.553399***  1.940247*** 
_cons  60.542  5.193902***  6.589769***    60.186  3.784221***  7.761941*** 
               
Quantile 
(.5) 
.50 Pseudo R2 =    0.3125    .50 Pseudo R2 =    0.2695 
tariff  -0.827  0.4682227*  .294963***    -0.735  .2250161***  .1691178*** 
                                                                                                                                            
people) increases coverage by 5.16 percentage points. 27 
 
gni04a  0.001  0.0009407  0.0009564    0.001  0.0006149  0.0005167 
popden  0.005  0.0114701  0.0086642    0.010  .0048652**  .0051347** 
corrupt  3.817  1.395012***  1.991667*    4.974  1.040846***  1.040186*** 
doctors  7.123  1.317103***  1.558888***    5.158  1.090614***  .9177932*** 
_cons  64.191  4.881548***  6.499429***    65.538  3.844374***  3.537321*** 
               
Quantile 
(.6) 
.60 Pseudo R2 =    0.3023    .60 Pseudo R2 =    0.2722 
tariff  -0.234  0.4590907  0.2642471    -0.815  .1965511***  .2574008*** 
gni04a  0.001  0.0008152  0.0007689    0.000  0.000545  .0007517*** 
popden  0.013  0.0123093  0.0080778    0.011  0.0079037  0.0086459 
corrupt  4.069  1.356541***  1.327228***    4.411  1.125132***  1.454207*** 
doctors  7.166  1.135346***  1.150167***    4.748  .9009561***  1.084565*** 
_cons  64.927  4.773336***  4.498341***    69.829  4.898721***  4.779701*** 
               
Quantile 
(.75) 
.75 Pseudo R2 =    0.2263    .75 Pseudo R2 =    0.2411 
tariff  -0.561  0.3661937  0.3202669*    -0.733  .2841977***  .1977535*** 
gni04a  0.001  0.0008435  0.0009127    0.001  .0005282**  0.0006976 
popden  0.009  0.0137859  0.0089993    0.005  0.0134377  0.0055851 
corrupt  3.333  1.374244**  1.486914**    3.347  1.040877***  .9085314*** 
doctors  5.722  1.213297***  1.32848***    4.930  .9128649***  .873459*** 
_cons  72.872  5.23648***  5.338117***    75.580  3.115575***  3.246074*** 
               
Quantile 
(.9) 
.90 Pseudo R2 =    0.1116    .90 Pseudo R2 =    0.1017 
tariff  -0.237  0.4483761  0.2403709    -0.368  0.4449361  -0.3684446 
gni04a  0.001  0.0009777  0.000591*    0.001  0.0009309  0.0009981 
popden  0.008  0.0156465  0.0072305    0.018  0.0139216  .0176458* 
corrupt  1.294  1.392382  0.9611167    2.210  2.006037  2.210044* 
doctors  3.314  1.709302*  0.7636374***    4.537  1.424357***  4.536767** 




4. The Impact of Value Added Taxes on Medicines 
As Table 2 shows, in addition to import tariffs, many countries impose value 
added taxes and other charges on the sale of medicines.  We have not conducted a 
regression analysis of the effect of these taxes on access to medicines, however we 
have examined the impact of such taxes on a typical patient purchasing anti-retroviral 
medicines in South Africa. Although South Africa does not have import tariffs, the 
government does impose VAT on all medicines.  The country has one of the highest 
rates of HIV infection in the world at approximately 21.5 percent of the population.  
The government’s program to provide antiretroviral therapy through the state 
healthcare system has been delayed and is largely inadequate; as a result many people 
living with HIV/AIDS seek treatment through the private sector.   
A month’s supply of antiretroviral triple therapy consisting of Combivir and 28 
 
Nevirapine, is likely to cost R 586 ($101) for the drugs alone.  Of this amount, R72 
($14) is paid directly to the South African government in the form of VAT. If the 
government were to waive VAT, however, patients would be able to afford more of 
the fresh fruit, vegetables and meat that they should consume in order to remain 
healthy and be able to maintain their antiretroviral therapy. Among the billions of 
Rand raised by the South African government, the R72 raised via VAT on each 
person's monthly antiretroviral therapy makes little difference to the life of the 
government, but that money can make an enormous difference to the lives of ordinary 




Essential Foodstuffs Denied Due to South Africa’s VAT 




Item  Unit Cost  Quantity  Total (South African Rand) 
Brown bread  3.59/loaf 2 R 7.18
Eggs  1.05/egg 6 R 6.3
Low fat milk  5.69/litre 1 R 5.69
Maize meal  2.59/kg 1 R 2.59
Bananas  4.99/kg 1 R 4.99
Beetroot  5.32/kg 0.5 R 2.66
Tomatoes  9.99/kg 0.5 R 4.99
Broccoli  5.99/kg 0.5 R 2.99
Lean minced beef  27.95/kg 0.5 R 13.98
Whole chicken  18.99/kg 1.1 R 20.89
TOTAL      R 72.26
 
 
Bureaucracy and delays in delivery  
The taxes and tariffs that governments impose directly increase the cost of 
medicines and medical equipment to patients.  However, there are other non-tariff 
barrier costs that, while difficult to quantify, increase the cost of medicine.  Onerous 
and difficult customs procedures that delay the transit of goods not only delay getting 
medicines to patients, they also add to the costs of manufacturers, agents and 
distributors.   
For instance, the US government warns that Nigeria’s “ports continue to 
                                                 
38 Table 13 details the basket of goods that a patient could afford if the South African government did 
not impose VAT on medicines. 29 
 
present major obstacles to trade. Importers face inordinately long clearance 
procedures, high berthing and unloading costs, erratic application of customs 
regulations and corruption.”
40 It isn’t only commercial organisations that face barriers 
to importing goods to Nigeria.  Confidential enquiries made by the authors found that 
the process of securing exemptions for donated medicines was extremely arduous, 
with reports that the President of Nigeria himself must authorise customs exemptions 
for donated medicines.  This inevitably leads to immense delays in clearing the goods; 
consequently those in need of treatment are left without it. 
While Nigeria’s port system may well be one of the slowest and most corrupt 
in Africa, anecdotal evidence suggests that many other African countries have a great 
deal of scope to improve their port and customs procedures as well. 
Apart from the slow process of clearing goods through customs, most African 
countries require that pharmaceutical products are registered with their own medicine 
control agencies, even when the medicines are registered for use in the US, the EU 
and Japan.  In these cases, domestic drug regulators simply delay the approval of 
medicines that have already been approved by and are being used in other markets.
41 
The South African drug regulator, the Medicines Control Council (MCC) is 
notoriously inefficient and tardy with its approval process.  On average, drugs that 
have already been registered for use in the US, EU and Japan can wait for 39 months 
for approval in the South African system.
42  
In 2002, the Namibian Medicines Control Council announced that it required 
all drug manufacturers to re-register all medicines that were registered in the country 
prior to 1990, the year Namibia gained independence.  There is no reasonable 
healthcare argument in favour of this requirement. The move amounts to shameless 
bureaucratic empire building by the Namibian department of health.  
The inefficiency and obstructionism of drug regulators imposes enormous, 
though largely unquantifiable, costs on manufacturers and patients. Along with the 
                                                                                                                                            
39 Source: Dischem Pharmacy and Pick ‘n Pay Supermarket  
40 US Trade Representative, “Foreign Trade Barriers – Nigeria,” USTR, US Government, available at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2004/2004_National_Trade_Estimate/20
04_NTE_Report/Section_Index.html?ht=  (accessed February 21, 2006) 
41 Where a therapy is designed to treat an infectious disease in a developing country, domestic drug 
regulators play an important role because drug manufacturers do not register these medicines in 
developed countries. A private agency however might do a more efficient and effective job of ensuring 
that drugs are safe and effective. 
42 Health Systems Trust, “Drugs for the poor collect dust as council drags its feet,” available at: 30 
 
direct costs of compliance, drug manufacturers face the considerable opportunity 
costs of not being able to sell their product.  These costs however pale in comparison 
to the costs faced by patients forced to go without a particular therapy for several 
years while the domestic medicine control agencies satisfy themselves that the drug is 
safe. 
Reforming the regulatory regime and customs procedures is an essential step 
for developing countries to take in order to reduce the cost of medicines to the world’s 
poorest people. Many developing countries face considerable difficulties with fake or 
counterfeit drugs being imported and sold to unsuspecting patients.  Governments 
should reform the regulatory and customs procedures in a way that does not 
compromise the quality of medicines, but improves the trading environment for 
legitimate producers and distributors.   
 
5. Discussion 
As we have already mentioned, there are numerous and varied reasons for the 
fact that many people around the world, mostly in poor countries, lack access to 
medicines and decent medical care. The World Health Organisation considers that 
along with the general inadequacies of health systems in poor countries, access to 
medicines is determined by four distinct key factors; rational use, affordable prices, 
sustainable financing and reliable health and supply systems.
43 
In order to improve access to medicines, the WHO proposes that countries 
implement changes to these four areas of healthcare policy.  In particular setting 
rational medicine use guidelines involves the state setting guidelines over medicine 
use and choosing medicines that are appropriate to a country’s disease burden, the 
cost effectiveness of treatment and the country’s economic situation. Low-income 
countries have updated their own essential drugs lists as defined by the WHO.  In 
1985, only 5% of low income countries had updated their essential drugs lists in the 
previous 5 years, however by 1999, that figure had risen to 60%.   
According to the WHO, assuring affordable prices can be achieved either 
through “obtaining the best possible prices through the selection and purchasing 
process” or through “ensuring price regulation throughout the supply chain from 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.hst.org.za/news/20040355 (accessed April 23, 2004).   
43 World Health Organisation (2004), “The World Medicines Situation,” WHO, Geneva, 2004. p 64 31 
 
manufacturer or importer to patient.”  Indeed, many countries implement a 
combination of these two strategies in order to keep the price of medicines low and 
theoretically affordable.   
What the WHO does not point out however, is that the best mechanism to 
increase access to medicines is not greater regulation and more state interference in 
price setting, but is found in increased economic growth and greater wealth creation. 
Indeed, Barro (1997) reports, “a statistically significant positive correlation between 
per capita GDP growth and life expectancy.”
44  
The fact that the WHO does not actively involve itself with general economic 
policy is perhaps understandable. However, one would think that the primary reason 
for increased access to healthcare, longer life expectancies and improved standards of 
living – increased wealth and economic growth - should at least be mentioned by the 
WHO. 
There is little informed debate on how countries can grow their economies and 
increase wealth for all. Greater economic freedom, defined by secure property rights, 
the rule of law, low taxes, limited government and more open trade drive economic 
growth which in turn increases incomes. With increased incomes comes more funding 
that can be spent on health - and as was demonstrated in the vaccines model above 
one form of allocation is to increase the number of health professionals which 
improves vaccine access rates. 
Changing economic policies for poor countries can be a slow and politically 
fraught process, however, and it is little comfort for those who are dying now for an 
inability to afford medicines that their children or grandchildren may one day be able 
to afford medicines.  Governments do however have direct and immediate control 
over the import tariffs, taxes and duties imposed on medical interventions as well as 
the bureaucratic mechanisms that allow medicines to be sold in their countries. 
Removing these state imposed barriers should be the first and most logical place for 
any government interested in improving access to medicines to start. Removing 
barriers where most products are donated (especially vaccines) would seem to be the 
most urgent priority. 
A 2004 project by the WHO and Health Action International (HAI) on 
                                                 




medicine pricing in 9 African countries suggested that the removal of import taxes 
and levies on essential medicines would lower prices and improve access.  Laing and 
Olcay’s study for the WHO also recommends that countries should remove import 
tariffs and taxes.  Yet these state-imposed barriers to access are rarely criticised by 
intergovernmental agencies, health charities and NGOs.  For instance, a 2002 report 
by Claire Short, then Secretary of State for International Development to British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair on access to essential medicines does not mention any of 
the state-imposed barriers to access.   
However one of the world’s leading agencies involved in improving 
healthcare and access to medicines, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, 
considers that taxes and tariffs inhibit access to medicines. Global Fund grant 
agreements specifically state, “the assistance financed hereunder shall be free from 
any customs duties, tariffs, import taxes, or other similar levies and taxes (including 
value-added tax) imposed under laws in effect in the Host Country.” However, even 
when an import tariff or tax is waived, the process of securing that exemption is likely 
to be slow and arduous.  If the principle of waiving taxes and tariffs on Global Fund 
drugs makes sense, then countries should extend that logic to all other medicines, 
devices and medical services.   
The problem however is that in some cases, as explained above, import tariffs 
and taxes may be in place because they raise much needed revenue and, in the case of 
tariffs, foreign exchange for ministries of finance.  These tariffs could also protect the 
local pharmaceutical industry from international competition.  Laing and Olcay 
(2005) argue that because import tariffs are imposed on active pharmaceutical 
ingredients (API) as well as on completed pharmaceuticals, there is little logic to the 
trade protection argument.   
However, a country such as India produces both API as well as completed 
pharmaceuticals.  The import duties on API will protect the local producers of API 
from competition abroad and is likely to raise prices of locally produced drugs that 
use local API.   
In any event, Laing and Olcay’s analysis presupposes that there has to be some 
sort of logic behind trade policy and protectionism.  In reality governments are often 
lobbied and captured by special interests to secure special treatment for their 
particular niche. There need be little benefit to the economy or consumers as a whole, 33 
 
and in some cases, little benefit to the entire industry.   
An example of this and an illustration of the importance of trade protection to 
local pharmaceutical manufacturers can be found in the recent lobbying in favour of 
import tariffs by East African pharmaceutical producers.  Since the imposition of a 
10% import tariff by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in February 2005 and then the 
subsequent removal of those tariffs by Kenya in April 2005, local medicine 
manufacturers have lobbied to retain the tariffs. 
Harpreet Duggal, secretary general of the Tanzanian Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association told journalists that Kenya’s move would kill 
pharmaceutical industries in the region. Mr Duggal’s argument relies on the old, and 
largely discredited, infant industry argument, which proposes that new industries need 
government protection rather than competition. Mr Duggal maintains that Kenya’s 
action to lower its import tariffs only benefits the multinational pharmaceutical 
industry: “We find that action goes against the very spirit of the East African member 
states,” he said. Other Tanzanian business leaders backed Mr Duggal claiming that the 
funds raised by the Government could be used to buy antiretroviral drugs for 
thousands of patients.
45 
There is little in the way of economic evidence to suggest that Mr Duggal’s 
argument would improve access to medicines or indeed promote anything other than 
the narrow interests of a few drug producers.  Yet this forceful lobbying undermines 
Laing and Olcay’s assertion that import tariffs on medicines do not benefit any 
particular group.  Furthermore, their conclusion that import tariffs represent a tiny 
fraction of a country’s GDP ignores the fact that they represent a very sizable amount 
of money for particular producers.  
Improving access to medicines has been the focus of countless United Nations 
initiatives and has been a major preoccupation of the World Trade Organisation’s 
Doha Development Round.  Much of the focus on improving access to medicines has 
been on the price of those medicines, and specifically the price at which drug 
manufacturers sell their product.  In recent years a great deal of progress has been 
made in reducing the cost of essential medicines and on giving poor countries greater 
flexibility in importing cheap medicines.  And yet access to medicines remains low – 
largely because of grinding poverty and a lack of decent medical infrastructure so that 34 
 
countries can actually take advantage of lower drug prices. 
Our regression analysis confirms an inverse relationship between import 
tariffs on medicines and access to medicines.  In general, our analysis of the 
relationship between import tariffs on vaccines and vaccination rates supports the 
hypothesis that vaccine tariffs have a negative impact on vaccine coverage.  Though 
the data shortcomings prevent us from making definitive statements regarding the 
certainty and magnitude of this relationship, these results indicate that research into 
the issue is worthwhile, as is more rigorous data collection.  Indeed, it makes little 
sense for international agencies to so heavily subsidize these campaigns while vaccine 
costs are essentially marked up by national governments.  Recent studies suggest how 
effective mass immunization campaigns can be,
46 so it would behove national 
governments to eliminate as many barriers to success as possible.   
Poor countries should, despite the ongoing lobbying from special interest 
groups, press ahead with reducing tariffs, taxes and duties in medicines and reform 
the burdensome regulations that restrict drug access. Unless these countries wish only 
the wealthy elites to have access to medicines, they must make widespread changes to 
their domestic taxes, tariff and regulatory structures.  
The international community can certainly help the poorest countries to lower 
their tariffs (in general but specifically on donated medicines) by providing technical 
assistance (macro and micro economists in particular) to these countries to assess how 
to maintain revenue from other sources.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
45 “Ministers to Meet Over Suspended Tax on Drugs”, The East African,  June 15, 2005.  
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47Sources: Laing & Olcay (2005), International Monetary Fund, Central Government Finances (1996), 
CIA World Factbook (2005), United Nations Development Program, “Commitment to Health; 
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Country  % Tariff Revenue of Overall 
Government Revenue 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.000% 
Lesotho  0.000% 
Madagascar  0.000% 
Malaysia  0.000% 
Namibia  0.000% 
Senegal  0.000% 
South Africa  0.000% 
Swaziland  0.000% 
Uganda  0.000% 
China  0.004% 
Indonesia  0.006% 
Bangladesh  0.009% 
India  0.012% 
Congo, Rep  0.017% 
Philippines  0.018% 
Dominican Rep  0.019% 
Vietnam  0.037% 
Pakistan  0.041% 
Colombia  0.049% 
Algeria  0.049% 
Kenya  0.058% 
Costa Rica  0.062% 
Bolivia  0.067% 
Thailand  0.067% 
Mexico  0.069% 
Peru  0.080% 
Venezuela  0.105% 
El Salvador  0.153% 
Lebanon  0.431% 
Congo, Dem Rep  1.460% 37 
 
Table 2 





Country  % Tariff of Public 
Healthcare Budget 
Benin  0.000% 
Botswana  0.000% 
Brunei  0.000% 
Burkina Faso  0.000% 
Cambodia  0.000% 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.000% 
Guinea Bissau  0.000% 
Honduras  0.000% 
Lesotho  0.000% 
Madagascar  0.000% 
Malaysia  0.000% 
Mali  0.000% 
Mozambique  0.000% 
Namibia  0.000% 
Niger  0.000% 
Senegal  0.000% 
South Africa  0.000% 
Swaziland  0.000% 
Togo  0.000% 
Uganda  0.000% 
China  0.037% 
Bangladesh  0.054% 
Dominican Rep  0.146% 
India  0.150% 
Philippines  0.177% 
Chad  0.184% 
Indonesia  0.201% 
Laos  0.221% 
Brazil  0.225% 
Ghana  0.247% 
Colombia  0.258% 
Cent African Rep  0.271% 
Costa Rica  0.287% 
Congo, Rep  0.368% 
Bolivia  0.368% 
Mexico  0.377% 
Vietnam  0.466% 
Peru  0.496% 
Algeria  0.574% 
Pakistan  0.597% 
Thailand  0.626% 
El Salvador  0.638% 
Venezuela  0.652% 
Tanzania  0.704% 
Morocco  0.777% 
Kenya  0.837% 
Cameroon  0.942% 
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Ecuador  1.285% 
Lebanon  2.484% 
Nigeria  2.497% 
Congo, Dem Rep  8.240% 
Myanmar  N/A 










HS Heading  HS Description 
3005 
 
Wadding, gauze, bandages and similar 
articles for medical, surgical, dental or 
veterinary purposes 
3006.10 
Sterile surgical catgut, similar sterile suture 
materials and sterile tissue adhesives for 









Opacifying preparations for X-ray 
examinations; diagnostic reagents designed 




Dental cements and other dental fillings; 








Tariffs on medical devices covered in this paper’s discussions include 
adhesive dressings and sterile surgical catgut, (over 12% tariffs in Thailand and 
Argentina).  Many medical devised are not covered in this paper’s analysis, such as 
surgical towels (HS 6307) and sterilizers (HS 8419). The value of the market for all 
devices was $220 billion in 2004 (Advamed 2002, Demoor pers comm. 2006). 
Although the value of the market is much smaller in poor countries, this is where most 
tariffs are paid, and much as in the above analysis, these tariffs probably harm access. 
Indeed, industry lobby group, Advamed, says that their ‘members pay most of their 
















Wavgactive  Weighted average tariff across 
subcategories of the four digit category 
(3003) for active ingredients in 
pharmaceutical products (varies) 
Wavgfnsh  Weighted average tariff across 
subcategories of the four digit category 
(3004) for  finished pharmaceutical 
products (varies) 
Totwavg  Average of Wavgfnsh and Wavgactive 
Hexpr  Private Health Expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP (2002) 
Hexpub  Public Health Expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP (2002) 
Rural  Percentage of Population living in rural 
areas (2002) 
GNI02  GNI per capita in 2002 
Corrupt  Score on Corruption Perceptions Index 
(high scores inversely related to 
corruption) (2004)
i 
Tariff  6 Digit Vaccine tariff rate (varies) 
Doctors  Physicians per 1000 people (2004) 
Popden Population  per  km
2 
DPT3  Percentage of target population immunized 
with third dose of Diphtheria, Pertussis, 
and Tetanus and Vaccine (2004) 
MCV  Percentage of target population immunized 
with Measles  Containing Vaccine 
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2.  List of Countries Not Included in the Regression due to Data Limitations or Population Size of 
Less than 500,000.           














Occupied Palestinian Territories 
Saint Lucia 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Samoa (Western) 












3. Data Output Spreadsheet 
 
Country wavgfnsh  yearfnsh  wavgactive  Savgactive  totwavg  gni2002  hexpr  accessord  rural 
Albania 0  2002  0  0  0  1390  1.044  low  56.23 
Algeria 5.24  2003  5  5  5.12  1720  1.118  high  41.17 
Angola 2  2002  2  2  2  680  2.905  Very  low  64.31 
Armenia 0  2001  0  0  0  800  4.175  Very  low  35.54 
Azerbaijan 0  2002  0.26  0.69  0.13  720  2.8823  low  49.86 
Bangladesh 9.63  2004  7.45  5.73  8.54  370  2.3188  low  75.73 
Belarus 8.26  2002  5  5  6.63  1310  1.6704  low  29.11 
Belize 10.84  2003  9.62  2.67  10.23  3090  2.7404  medium  51.62 
Benin 0  2004  0  0  0  380  2.6132  low  55.43 
Bhutan 0  2004  0  0  0  590  0.351  medium  91.46 
Bolivia 10  2004  10  10  10  930  2.814  low  36.62 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  3.93  2001  0  0  1.965  1410  4.6184  medium  55.62 
Botswana 0  2001  0  0  0  2780  2.286  medium  48.42 
Brazil 10.31  2004  9.51  10.04  9.91  2860  4.2739  Very  low  16.99 
Brunei 0  2003  0  0  0    0.763  very  high  23.88 
Bulgaria 0  2004  0  0  0  1790  2.854  medium  30.19 
Burkina Faso  0  2004  0  0  0  250  2.3263  low  82.17 
Burundi 15  2002  15  15  15  90  2.355  Very  low  90.05 
Cambodia 0  2003  0  0  0  290  9.948  Very  low  81.39 
Cameroon 5  2002  5  5  5  560  3.3948  low  48.64 
Central African Republic  5  2002  5  5  5  250  2.2776  low  57.26 
Chad 5  2002  5  5  5  210  3.7765  Very  low  75.03 
China 4.41  2004  5.6  5.67  5.005  970  3.8454  medium  61.37 
Colombia 8.04  2004  5  5  6.52  1830  1.3851  medium  23.6 
Congo, Rep.  5  2002  5  5  5  620  0.6534  low  46.48 
Cote d'Ivoire  0  2004  0  0  0  610  4.8112  medium  55.08 
Djibouti 10  2002  10  10  10  850  2.9673  medium  16.36 
Dominica 8.76  2003  6.78  3.93  7.77  3190  1.8368  medium  27.96 
Dominican Republic  3  2004  3  3  3  2370  3.8796  low  40.65 43 
 
Ecuador 5.64  2004  5  5  5.32  1510  3.072  very  low  38.21 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  6.83  2002  7.05 7.75  6.94  1470  3.1066  medium  57.79 
El Salvador  5  2004  0  0  2.5  2110  4.424  medium  40.56 
Equatorial Guinea  5  2002  5  5  5  9110  0.5004  very low  51.95 
Eritrea 2  2002  2  2  2  150  1.8513  low  80.01 
Ethiopia(excludes Eritrea)  8.56  2002  5  5  6.78  100  3.1407  low  84.35 
Gabon 5  2002  5  5  5  3000  2.5241  very  low  16.33 
Georgia 1  2004  5  5  3  710  2.7702  very  low  48.05 
Ghana  4.73  2004  10  10 7.365  270 3.304  very  low  54.64 
Grenada 12.58  2003  11.37  7.78  11.975  3290  1.653  high  59.28 
Guatemala 5  2004  4.93  4.17  4.965  1750  2.52  low  53.65 
Guinea-Bissau 0  2004  0  0  0  130  3.2634  very  low  66.03 
Guyana  12.04  2003  12.49  7.03 12.265  860 1.3272  very  low 62.39 
Honduras 0  2004  0  0  0  910  3.0256  very  low  54.4 
India 30  2004  35  35  32.5  470  4.8007  very  low  71.69 
Indonesia 5  2003  5  5  5  830  2.048  medium  54.47 
Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  54.26  2004  100  100 77.13  1740 3.132  medium 33.4 
Jamaica 7.7  2003  7.62  4.48  7.66  2690  2.556  very  high  47.85 
Jordan 4.18  2003  0  0  2.09  1810  5.0127  high  20.92 
Kazakhstan 0  2000        1520  1.638  low  44.1 
Kenya  5.29  2004  6.86  2.5 6.075  360 2.744  very  low  60.66 
Kyrgyz Republic  0  2003  0  0  0  290  2.0984  low  66 
Lao PDR  10  2001  10  10  10  320  1.4239  low  79.31 
Lebanon 5  2002  5  5  5  4070  8.0385  medium  12.54 
Lesotho 0  2001        540  0.9362  medium  82.04 
Libya 0  2002  0  0  0  4820  1.7424  high  13.77 
Macedonia, FYR  3.67  2004  2  2  2.835  1710  1.0404  low  40.44 
Madagascar 0  2001  0  0  0  230  0.945  low  73.39 
Malawi 0  2001  0  0  0  160  5.7722  very  low  83.67 
Malaysia 0  2003  0  0  0  3550  1.7556  low  36.24 
Maldives 5  2003  5  5  5  2150  0.719  low  71.18 
Mali 0  2004  0  0  0  240  2.214  low  67.73 44 
 
Mauritania 0  2001  0  0  0  400  1.0062  low  38.32 
Mauritius 5  2002  5  5  5  3850  0.6699  high  56.67 
Mexico 6.91  2004  14.67  16.07  10.79  5960  3.3611  medium  24.51 
Moldova 0  2001  0  0  0  470  2.926  low  53.9 
Morocco 12.4  2003  23.74  29.38  18.07  1170  3.0912  low  42.56 
Mozambique 0  2003  0  0  0  200  1.682  low  64.39 
Myanmar 1.5  2003  1.5  1.5  1.5    1.793  low  70.48 
Namibia 0  2001  0  0  0  1650  2.0033  medium  67.56 
Nepal  9.29  2004  15  15 12.145  230 3.7856  very  low 85.02 
Nicaragua 0  2004  0  0  0  730  4.0211  very  low  42.68 
Niger 0  2004  0  0  0  180  1.968  low  77.8 
Nigeria 20  2002  20  20  20  300  3.4968  very  low  53.38 
Oman 5  2002  5  5  5  7740  0.6256  medium  22.43 
Pakistan  13.63  2004  10  10 11.815  490 2.0832  low  65.88 
Panama 2.77  2001  4.93  2.4  3.85  4040  2.5187  medium  42.85 
Papua New Guinea  0  2004  0  0  0  510  0.4902  medium  86.78 
Paraguay 10.82  2004  8.27  8.44  9.545  1170  5.1996  very  low  42.78 
Peru 12  2004  12  12  12  2020  2.2044  low  26.13 
Philippines 3.84  2003  3  3  3.42  1020  1.769  low  39.03 
Romania 6.25  2001  9.29  9  7.77  1910  2.1483  medium  45.35 
Russian Federation  9.81  2002  6.5  6.67  8.155  2120  2.7404  low  26.71 
Rwanda 2.5  2003  0  0  1.25  230  2.354  very  low  81.5 
Saudi Arabia  2.15  2004  0  0  1.075  8440  0.9847  high  12.44 
Senegal 0  2004  0  0  0  460  2.7948  low  50.4 
Solomon Islands  5  1995  5  5  5  560  0.3264  medium  83.48 
South Africa  0  2001  0  0  0  2630  5.1678  medium  43.08 
Sri Lanka  0  2004  0  0  0  850  1.8981  high  78.93 
St.  Lucia  8.43 2003  8.79  4.22 8.61  3830 1.58  low  69.49 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines  8.6  2003 8.08 5.89  8.34  3010  2.0355  medium  41.81 
Sudan 10  2002  10  10  10  400  3.8857  very  low  61.09 
Suriname  11.93  2000  11.73  8.83 11.83  1930 3.324  high  24.02 
Swaziland 0  2001  0  0  0  1190  2.43  high  76.4 45 
 
Syrian Arab Republic  1  2002  1  1  1  1080  2.7642  medium  49.81 
Tajikistan 5  2002  5  5  5  180  2.3859  Very  low  75.18 
Tanzania 10  2003  10  10  10  300  2.2148  low  64.6 
Thailand  18.01  2003  10  10 14.005  2000 1.3332  high  68.05 
Togo 0  2004  0  0  0  280  1.829  low  64.84 
Tunisia  13.79  2004  10.4  12 12.095  1990 2.9058  low  36.27 
Turkey 0  2003  0  0  0  2510  2.223  very 
medium 33.74 
Turkmenistan 0  2002  0  0  0  850  1.2599  low  54.62 
Uganda 0  2004  0  0  0  240  5.3354  low  87.73 
Ukraine 7.02  2002  1.92  1.5  4.47  780  1.3583  low  32.74 
Uzbekistan 0  2001  0  0  0  450  2.9975  low  63.29 
Vanuatu 0  2002  0  0  0  1070  1.0032  very  low  77.12 
Venezuela 9.2  2004  9.93  9  9.565  3970  2.6019  medium  12.36 
Vietnam 5.71  2004  0.08  1  2.895  430  3.6816  medium  74.24 
Yemen 5  2000  5  5  5  490  2.6936  low  74.31 
Zambia 0  2003  1.1  0.83  0.55  340  2.7318  low  64.05 
Zimbabwe  17.6  2002  2.76  5 10.18  2180 4.114  low  65.03 
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anom  tariff  wavgvacc doctors  immdpt04 immsl04  popden04  gni04 
Albania 0  0  1.389292  97  96  116.3495  2080 
Algeria 0  0  0.846  86  81  13.6035  2280 
Angola 2  2  0.077  59  64  11.22965  1030 
Armenia 0  0  3.525857  91  92  108.1439  1120 
Azerbaijan 0  0  3.53562  96  98  100.2366  950 
Bangladesh 0  0  0.230678  85  77  1075.517  440 
Belarus 10  10  4.49651  99  99  47.38943  2120 
Belize 0  0  1.045019  95  95  12.39474  3940 
Benin 0  0  0.057591  83  85  62.28724  530 
Bhutan     0.051405  89  87  19.06405  760 
Bolivia 10  10  0.733371  81  64  8.287128  960 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  0  0  1.338396  84  88  74.92188  2040 
Botswana 0  0  0.287644  97  90  3.047269  4340 
Brazil 2.64  2.64  2.056482  96  99  21.15984  3090 
Brunei 0  0  1.005892  92  99  68.58   
Bulgaria 0  0  3.384453  95  95  70.32451  2740 
Burkina Faso  0  0  0.039972  88  78  45.32164  360 
Burundi 15  15  0.051544  74  75  285.9415  90 
Cambodia 0  0  0.155701  85  80  77.0451  320 
Cameroon 5  5  0.074  73  64  35.23851  800 
Central African Republic  5  5  0.035  40  35  6.336314  310 
Chad 5  5  0.025301  50  56  7.006777  260 
China 3  3  1.642473  91  84  139.374  1290 
Colombia 5  5  1.350007  89  92  43.61221  2000 
Congo, Rep.  5  5  0.251  67  65  11.287  770 
Cote d'Ivoire  0  0  0.09  50  49  53.77359  770 
Djibouti 10  10  0.132866  64  60  30.86799  1030 
Dominica 0  0  0.493  99  99  95.27955  3650 
Dominican Republic  0  0  1.88  71  79  183.1627  2080 
Ecuador 5  5  1.476256  90  99  47.68097  2180 47 
 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  1  1  2.117838  97  97  69.01402  1310 
El Salvador  0  0  1.273731  90  93  321.3169  2350 
Equatorial Guinea  5  5  0.246  33  51  18.04207   
Eritrea 2  2  0.03  83  84  44.32673  180 
Ethiopia(excludes Eritrea)  5  5  0.028581  80  71  70  110 
Gabon 5  5  0.289375  38  55  5.330974  3940 
Georgia 0  0  3.906598  78  86  65.05972  380 
Ghana 10  10  0.09  80  83  92.73095  3760 
Grenada 0  0  0.495  83  74  310.8824  2130 
Guatemala 0  0  0.896  84  75  116.204  460 
Guinea-Bissau 0  0  0.166  80  80  54.52429  160 
Guyana 0  0  0.482  91  88  3.922052  990 
Honduras 0  0  0.832  89  92  63.82576  1030 
India 30  30  0.512557  64  56  363.2462  620 
Indonesia 2.5  2.5  0.162352  70  72  120.3376  1140 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  4  4  1.049192  99  96  40.88742  2300 
Jamaica 0  0  0.85  77  80  246.0541  2900 
Jordan 0  0  2.049699  95  99  61.17117  2140 
Kazakhstan 0  0  3.301971  82  99  5.556173  2260 
Kenya 0  0  0.132  73  73  56.928  460 
Kyrgyz Republic  0  0  2.678533  99  99  26.58707  400 
Lao PDR  5  5  0.59  45  36  25.09727  390 
Lebanon 5  5  3.252433  92  96  445.1543  4980 
Lesotho 0  0  0.054  78  70  59.59961  740 
Libya 0  0  1.29  97  99  3.224801  4450 
Macedonia, FYR  0  0  2.191234  94  59  81.08533  2350 
Madagascar 0  0  0.086868  61  59  29.7486  300 
Malawi 0  0  0.011317  89  80  119.0476  170 
Malaysia 0  0  0.701958  99  95  76.70065  4650 
Maldives 5  5  0.776747  96  97  998.4  2510 
Mali 0  0  0.044438  76  75  9.75258  360 
Mauritania 0  0  0.138  70  64  2.834605  420 48 
 
Mauritius 5  5  0.85  98  98  607.996  4640 
Mexico 8.5  8.5  1.714835  98  96  54.48763  6770 
Moldova 0  0  2.694388  98  96  128.2755  710 
Morocco 2.5  2.5  0.483126  97  95  68.56374  1520 
Mozambique 0  0  0.024354  72  77  24.35945  250 
Myanmar 0  0  0.301949  82  78  75.88776  500 
Namibia 0  0  0.295  81  70  2.469887  2370 
Nepal 0  0  0.052328  80  73  176.2238  260 
Nicaragua 0  0  1.644013  79  84  46.16145  790 
Niger 0  0  0.033437  62  74  9.552381  230 
Nigeria 20  20  0.26916  25  35  153.7161  390 
Oman 5  5  1.256528  99  98  8.591322  390 
Pakistan 10  10  0.66244  65  67  197.1772  600 
Panama 0  0  1.68  99  99  40.68  4450 
Papua New Guinea  0  0  0.051559  46  44  12.42153  580 
Paraguay 3.72  3.72  1.17  76  89  14.55215  1170 
Peru 12  12  1.167  87  89  21.48438  2360 
Philippines 3  3  1.163244  79  80  278.3647  1170 
Romania 10  10  1.887043  97  97  95.27124  2920 
Russian Federation  6.67  6.67  4.17157  97  98  8.461538  3410 
Rwanda 0  0  0.018737  89  84  340.9803  220 
Saudi Arabia  0  0  1.397156  96  97  10.79225  10430 
Senegal 0  0  0.075  87  57  54.53696  670 
Solomon Islands      0.13  80  72  16.82247  550 
South Africa  0  0  0.692095  93  81  37.54724  3630 
Sri Lanka  0  0  0.428241  97  96  300.1702  1010 
St. Lucia  0  0  5.18  91  95  268.28  4310 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines  0  0  0.877  99  99  277.6769  3650 
Sudan 10  10  0.15819  55  59  16.4765  530 
Suriname 0  0  0.45  85  86  2.839539  2250 
Swaziland 0  0  0.176198  83  70  65.10703  1660 
Syrian Arab Republic  1  1  1.399254  99  98  96.85493  1190 49 
 
Tajikistan 5  5  2.179868  82  89  45.73257  280 
Tanzania 10  10  0.022659  95  94  41.42192  330 
Thailand 0  0  0.3008  98  96  122.1398  2540 
Togo 0  0  0.05655  71  70  91.29676  380 
Tunisia 0  0  0.7  97  95  64.36663  2630 
Turkey 0  0  1.240929  85  81  93.16165  3750 
Turkmenistan 0  0  3.171174  97  97  10.49284  1340 
Uganda 0  0  0.047  87  91  131.4054  270 
Ukraine 10  10  2.973874  99  99  82.85147  1260 
Uzbekistan 0  0  2.885484  99  98  62.52414  460 
Vanuatu 0  0  0.11  49  48  17.63489  1340 
Venezuela 5  5  1.939226  86  80  29.59016  4020 
Vietnam 0  0  0.534455  96  97  252.5423  550 
Yemen 5  5  0.21866  78  76  37.50213  570 
Zambia 0  0  0.069  80  84  14.12448  450 
Zimbabwe 0  0  0.057343  85  80  34.12175  600 
             600 
 
 
       
 
 